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Abstract
This paper examines how West Africa is positioned within the contemporary discourse
of us. foreign policy. It is suggested that as a locus of us. foreign policy concern, West
Africa is primarily conceptualized as: a resource supplier, a potential terrorist base,
and an area in which grave abuses of basic rights are widespread. However, the writer
argues that these areas do not independently merit significant normative importance
in US. foreign policy terms. It is suggested that the US. approach accurately reflects its
foreign policy agenda which is primarily geared towards protecting Middle Eastern oil
supplies, combating anti-American aggressive failed states and fightingfundamentalist
Islamic terrorism. What little US. foreign policy interest there is in West Africa is
thus "terrorcentric," that is, it is presented in the context of combating fundamentalist
Islamic terrorism. This paucity offoreign policy interest is likely to remain the case
throughout the Bush administration in the probable absence of any "external shock"
clearly linked to the region.

Introduction
In this paper, the writer examines the positioning of West Africa within the
contemporary discourse of U.S. foreign policy. As part of its post-September 11,
2001 disposition, the Bush administration has largely defined itself through its
foreign policy. This foreign policy evokes and affirms key elements of the Bush
governmental doctrine. These are national security, the ideological value of
(selective) democratization, moral certitude and the enduring iconography of the
gun-slinging Texan wildcatter challenging all comers on his own terms.
A lot of the criticism of the first Bush administration was of its foreign policy
in general, and the Iraq War and occupation in particular. Critics argued that the
political goodwill created by the 2001 terrorist attacks had been squandered on
military adventurism which had at best a tangential connection to any Islamic
fundamentalist threat. This call was resonant in West Africa as elsewhere. But for
a variety of reasons the Iraq War has not mobilized the same popular expression of
dissatisfaction in most of Africa as it did in Europe and parts of the Middle East.
Published by DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University, 2006
1
105

African Social Science Review, Vol. 3 [2006], Iss. 3, Art. 6
AFRICAN SOCIAL SCIENCES REVEIW, VOLUME

3 (3), FALL 2006

In this paper, the writer considers what this foreign policy means for West
Mrica. It is argued that as a locus of foreign policy concern to the US., West
Mrica is primarily conceptualized in three ways. It is seen as a resource supplier,
a potential terrorist base, and an area in which grave abuses of basic rights are
widespread. Of these, the first two are the dominant themes in formal foreign
policy discourse. They have the ability to be the source of external shocks to the
US. The accusation of widespread basic rights abuses in West Africa is generally
less important in formal discourse other than as a short~term opportunistic policy
tool. However, it is more important in the wider US. civil society "discourse. But
the external shock here is in reverse: human rights protection in West Africa can
be dependent upon US. or other countries' policy. But the human rights discourse
in West Africa has little real impact in the US.

West Africa in U S. Foreign Policy Discourse:
A Look at the Conceptual Framework
Rothchild characterizes large parts of postwar US. African policy as consisting of
"minimal engagement" (Rothchild 2001, 180). Even in more active eras, such as
the final stages of the Cold War, Rothchild's analysis reflects a policy rooted firmly
in a Sovietcentric approach: Africa was of interest largely in as much as it was an
ideological battleground in the Cold War.
The multifarious competing demands of foreign policy mean that foreign
policy machines tend to conceptualize countries in over~simplified ways. A regime
can muster only limited political capital and operational capacity. The complex
web of international relations is therefore often reduced to a small number of
priorities which are then portrayed in a fairly inflexible manner. This classification
is then largely adhered to unless a compelling reason appears for a change, in the
form of an external shock such as a war, act of aggression or catastrophe. In line
with this analysis, the writer suggests that the US. tends to conceptualize West
Africa in foreign policy terms in three ways.
First, in economic terms it sees it as a resource supplier, most crucially of
oiL A clear, consistent example of this is the enduring close relationship between
the US. and Nigeria. Nigeria is the main regional oil producer and a significant
producer of a form of sweet crude which is fairly uncommon. The US. and Nigeria
enjoy a joint security relationship which is in large part traceable to the growing
US. reliance on Nigerian oiL The US. part of this relationship involves support
for the Nigerian government and armed forces, and this has been demonstrated
by the use of a US. aircraft carrier to patrol the West African coast. The Nigerian
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side of the relationship is a straightforward exertion of influence. Nigeria prides
itself on its importance as a supplier to the U.S. and the financial benefits which it
derives from that relationship. At the same time Nigeria puffs itself up regionally
as the economic and political hegemonic power.
Secondly; the U.S. conceptualizes West Africa as a place which hosts possible
terrorists (Ruane 2004). This conceptualization reflects a number of elements.
Foremost are supposed links to Islamic terrorists, possibly including the al-Qaeda .
network. For the most part, these concerns have been based on rumor rather
than hard fact. For example, mostly circumstantial evidence has linked ethnically
Lebanese diamond traders in Sierra Leone to al-Qaeda (Gberie 2002 and 2003;
Farah 2004). There have also been some better grounded concerns regarding
specific regional threats, such as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat
(GSPC) in Algeria and other nearby countries. However, this increased focus on
the region as a possible base for terrorists has brought a heightened interest and
some transparency of non-terrorist criminal activity in West Africa. Examples
include drug trafficking. oil bunkering off Nigeria, and the sort of crime on
foreigners epitomized by the infamous "419s:' Such serious organized crime does
not directly threaten U.S. interests in the region. But it is still of some curiosity to
Washington and accordingly merits a watching brief. This is often reflected in the
changing priorities being given to local alliances on the ground.
In this, the writer suggests that post-9!1l policy worldwide has been
"Terrorcentric:' Rhetorically at least, regional involvement in Africa and elsewhere
has hinged on a polarizing analysis which classifies countries by their commitment
to and relevance in the global War on Terror. A secondary polarizing analysis has
been democratization. For the first time since the Cold War ended, the U.S. has hit
upon a fundamental ideological clash which allows a sharp distinction to be drawn
between allies and everybody else: the acceptance of the democratic ideal. But the
U.S. attachment to the democracy remains a tactical one. Just as it remains happy
to ally itself closely to undemocratic regimes such as the House of Saud, it also
seems largely unconcerned by the absence or even decline of effective democracy
in many West African states. This is why West African policy has been focused on
terrorcentricity rather than the democratic element of current policy priorities.
Third, West Africa forms part of the American concern overall with Africa
as a locus of human rights abuse and social problems. Both the United States and
Western Europe continue to display an uncomfortably mixed message when it comes
to dealing with African governance. Rhetorically; they emphasize the importance of
African solutions to African problems. Western countries thereby largely externalize
responsibility for regional security or human rights issues. Concurrently; they take a
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dim view of much Mrican governance. The US. and many European chancelleries
often demonstrate a barely-concealed suspicion that Mrica is a primitive place where
modern policy discourse has limited utility. This may be seen in a comparison of US.
attitudes towards the spread of democracy in the Middle East with those towards
the non-development or even retreat of democracy in some African countries. The
human rights discourse is in any case often subsumed to perceived US. security
interests, illustrated by the continued democracy assistance supplied to hardline
regimes (Rothchild 2001). This ambiguous position results in what can seem like a
reflexive, incoherent set of tactical policies. It leads to over-optimistic expectations:
a local confusion as to what foreign involvement can be expected in any given
situation. It also creates a form of policy doublethink, whereby human rights abuses
are cited in some cases as a justification for action, while in other situations the
sheer scale of Africa's many human rights catastrophes is used as a justification for
non-intervention. Nonetheless, this latter point is slowly gathering momentu~. It is
fuel to the engine of the Congressional Black Caucus and African America activists
across the United States.

West Africa and a Broader

u.s. Foreign Policy Agenda

To understand the place West Africa occupies within the US. foreign policy
approach, it is first necessary to understand that approach. At the present time,
the War on Terror and US. foreign policy seem to be intertwined to an extent
that raises the question of what US. foreign policy is beyond the Global War on
Terror2 1 To understand this, let us first examine the War on Terror.
The strategic goals of the so-called global "War on Terror" were summarized
in 2004 by President Bush as follows: 2
• dismantling, disrupting, and destroying terrorists and their
organizations;
• denying terrorists places of sanctuary or support;
• denying terrorists chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons; and
• working for freedom and reform in the broader Middle East.
These then are the stated aims. We may contrast them to what seem to be
the actual aims. This is subject to the caveat that the war on terror is a rhetorical
construct under the guise of which we see a number of activities which mayor may
not reward classification. Far and away the most important and indeed highest impact
of these aims is the last one, of working for freedom and reform what is elastically
termed the "broader" Middle East. This in fact appears to be a selective aim - reform
in Saudi Arabia, for example, seems to be much further down the US. list than
reform in Syria or even Iran. Denying terrorists chemical, biological, radiological,
https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/assr/vol3/iss3/6
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and nuclear (CBRN) weapons is only part of the aim, which might more accurately
be characterized as denying CBRN capability to all actors (at both the non~state
and the state level) who currently lack such a capacity and do not meet the American
conception of ally. Reinforcing the hegemonic American position as the world's only
military superpower has a political potency at a time when its autonomy and majesty
are threatened by emergent military powers such as China, a world legal order keen
to assert its authority, and on a collision course with Washington over issues from
its Middle East policy to international criminal jurisdiction.
What remains of foreign policy beyond the global war on terror? At the
security level, it is difficult to discern much that has not now been swept up. Some
alliances continue independently of the global war on terror with states whose
commitment to the war is at best ambivalent, for example South Korea. But for
the most part, the global war on terror dominates the short-term foreign policy
outlook of the present administration and arguably of the whole government and
military machine.
If we play the crude foreign policy game of condensing these wide~ranging
aims into just a few words, we might say that U.S. foreign policy as it stands
is about selectively opening, enabling, and protecting markets, forcibly opening
certain foreign non-democratic states which otherwise threaten the US. and
staking a lead position in an emerging global cultural war. It is unclear that West
Africa is of much appeal to policymakers on any of these grounds. In terms of
the American-West African market, there is no clear U.S. incentive to change the
current situation. West Africa offers a very limited export opportunity for the
U.S. With respect to African exports to the US., there are probably no interests
so compelling that they command any form of meaningful military interest on the
part of the U.S. The one possible exception is oil and to date even this has only
attracted limited military aid to Nigeria in the form ofoccasional training or marine
operations in the Gulf of Guinea by the U.S. Navy. In respect of intervention in
foreign states, the US. clearly has no appetite for such action in West Africa. Even
a relatively straightforward military operation in a friendly environment has been
ruled as greater than the U.S. interest merits. A key recent example was American
unwillingness to deploy troops as Montovia fell in August 2003, other than to
protect and evacuate its nationals.
In terms of the cultural conflict, there is little in West Africa with which
the U.S. seeks to conflict. But this is the one area in which U.S. foreign policy
does increasingly seem to find a reason to cast its rule over West Africa. The U.S.
remains a fundamentalist Christian nation and, especially under the present
administration, this is on some levels a strong part of its foreign policy in Africa.
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As has been seen elsewhere on the continent, most notably Sudan, the US. is keen
tacitly to protect the interests of what domestic evangelical Christians perceive to
be persecuted Christian blocs (although in fact the characterization of the SPLA
as primarily Christian is an oversimplification which underplays the importance
of animism in southern Sudan). In West Africa, there is increasing strife between
the Christian south and Islamic north in a number of countries. To date this has
played out primarily in the form of power or resource~basedstruggles which have
not taken on a religious characterization. But in due course we may expect that
some of the Christian groups in West Africa will form more powerful advocacy
alliances with American Christians. Some pointers to this are already provided by
the rapid growth in US.-style Pentecostalism in West Africa. This would likely
increase the relevance of US. policy and influence in West Africa in the domestic
context for the US. government.

West Africa and Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorism
West Africa is gradually emerging as an area of considerable concern to the United
States in respect of its connections to Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. There are
a number of reasons for this. The writer will argue that there ar:e "pull" reasons,
which attract US. interest in their own right. There are also "push" reasons whereby
domestic US. policy helps to dictate the level of foreign policy interest in this area.
First on the "pull" side of the equation, there is a sizeable Islamic population in
the region, parts of which understandably feel that non~Islamic elements in their
national governments have treated them unfairly. Cote d'Ivoire provides a compelling
example, where the largely Muslim north has been politically and financially
marginalized by the Christian~dominatedsouth. Because of the nature of the West
African cartography, whereby the religious split follows a roughly horizontal line but
country borders are mostly vertical, the same problem recurs from Nigeria right up
to Sierra Leone. In these countries, the more prosperous coastal south is Christian~
controlled, while the interior Muslim populations are economically worse off. This
uneven spread is exacerbated by the tendenc[for the political elite in these countries
to be comprised from within the southern Christian population.
Secondly, in some ways this Islamic population is ripe for radicalization.
Scholars and policymakers disagree as to what the determinants of Islamic
radicalization are. Too often a straightforward correlation is claimed in a way
which is misleading. This does not mean that there is not an increased incidence
of terrorist involvement, especially at the operational level, amongst those who are
poor or uneducated. But there is no automatic connection. There is some evidence
of radicalization by both Christian and Muslim charities in West Africa. An
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Islamic example is the extensive provision of mosques and social infrastructure
by Middle Eastern Islamic charities, some of which are known elsewhere to act
as a conduit for terrorist funding. Much of this activity is directly traceable to
connections in Saudi Arabia which are known supporters of fundamentalist
terrorism. In addition, there is more localized evidence of the emergence of a
radical Islamic terrorist footprint. The most obvious example of this to date is the
successive local insurgencies of the self~styled"Taliban" (AI Sunna wal Jamma) in
Yobe State of Nigeria.
Thirdly are the operational advantages which are available in West Africa.
The geography is well~suited to groups seeking to avoid capture. This was
shown by the fact that at least some elements of the GSPC were able to sweep
across the desert from Algeria to Chad even while under United States military
surveillance. There is also the perceived closeness to the Middle East, although
this obscures the significant cultural and theological differences between Middle
Eastern states such as Yemen and the Islamic peoples in West Africa. Finally,
there are funding and arms flows in West Africa. For example, it is often claimed
that ethnic Lebanese control of the diamond trade in Ivory Coast has allowed
fundamentalist organizations to fund themselves through the trading of so~called
conflict diamonds. The existence of what are effectively failed states may also be
conducive to terrorist operations, although Menkhaus (2004, 71-75) disputes
this. He argues that terrorist networks appear to function best where states are
governed badly, rather than not at alL Even accepting this analysis, though, the
point remains relevant, simply shifting from Liberia and arguably Sierra Leone to
others such as Cote d'Ivoire.
These concerns all contain some legitimacy, although none of them is
especially compelling in its own right. Operating with fixed resources and far
greater immediate security challenges, most notably in the Middle East, it is also
understandable that the United States has thus far seen Africa as a low priority in
its War on Terror.
What would it take to change this~ It is apparent that West Africa has
already started to assume a higher importance than previously. This may be seen
with the Trans Sahara Counter Terrorist Initiative and the deployment of U.S.
military forces in the Gulf of Guinea. But such initiatives have echoes of what
Walt (2000, 79) characterized in the Clinton era as "hegemony on the cheap:' The
relative position of West Africa is dependent on what happens elsewhere. There
is a perceived centrality of the Middle East to U.S. homeland security, the ongoing
U.S. dependence on Middle Eastern oil and the entrenchment of radical Islam in
parts of the Middle East. It therefore seems very unlikely that the U.S. foreign
Published by DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University, 2006
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policy outlook would shift markedly from the Middle East to West Mrica while
the global War on Terror is in progress.
What of the "push" side reasons:' The writer has suggested above that there is
a likelihood of closer links between Christian communities in West Africa and the
evangelical Christian movement in the United States. Given that this is so, there is
the opportunity for the Christian element of the US. government to characterize
Islamic radicalism as an attack on Christendom. To date, the rhetoric employed in
the War on Terror has largely avoided this. Indeed, the administration has been
at pains to stress that the War on Terror is not an attack on Islam. However, the
War on Terror looks very much like an attack on organizations which spring from
and find support in Islamic nations. Many millions of citizens in those countries
perceive the War on Terror as little more than a rough proxy for a war on Islam.
It should therefore be unsurprising if the US. takes the opportunity to attack
Islamic fundamentalism with vigor, since arguably this is a defensive measure
against what is perceived to be an Islamic attack on Christian values.

Marginal Elements ofForeign Policy
Where a region is not a key locus of foreign policy attention, marginal local
benefits from more generally implemented foreign policy can take on increased
significance. This likely amounts to an exertion of what Nye (1990) terms soft
power, even if it is not presented or necessarily even intended in this way. In this
sense, the Bush administration's action-led agenda on Africa has quietly delivered
significant benefits to the region as a whole, including West Africa. Fifteen billion
dollars of foreign aid over five years (including $10 billion of new money) was
earmarked in 2003 to fighting AIDS, mostly in Africa. A portion of this money
was cut from other foreign aid medical initiatives and the money has also been
slow to materialize in practice, as the international hubris over the Iraq invasion
has subsided. But nonetheless this promise represents a significant policy shift,
signaling that the AIDS issue is seen as a crucial one by Washington which is
worthy of deep financial support. This is itself will only dent the problem, but
it is still a significant step forward. Moreover, other donors seem to have been
influenced by the need to show at least some parity with the US. For example,
European Union AIDS funding rose sharply after Bush's announcement.
The Bush administration has also followed the Clinton administration in
opening up American markets to more African imports, albeit in a limited and
selective fashion. This has been seen primarily in extension of the liberalizing
African Growth and Opportunity Act. This Act, originally signed in 2000 and
renewed until 2015, offers a far more liberal US. market to most sub-Saharan
https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/assr/vol3/iss3/6
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countries than before. It has recently been supplemented by the Millennium
Challenge Account.

Conclusion
The implications of this analysis are both positive and normative. Positively, a
thesis is presented which purports to explain the relative unimportance of West
Africa in U.S. foreign policy discourse. Normatively, understanding and acting
upon this thesis could catalyze a reprioritization ofWest Africa within US foreign
policy discourse. Despite the growth in U.S. foreign policy interest in West Africa,
it remains a low-interest and low-priority area. Nothing in the analysis suggests
that this is likely to change significantly in the next several years.
West Africa could force its way more powerfully onto the 2005 - 2009 agenda
in two ways. First would be to position itself more clearly within the purview
of Washington's terrorcentric policy. This seems highly unlikely. Despite some
fundamentalist terrorist activity there, there is little evidence that West Africa
harbors a systemic tel'-l'orist threat to U.S. interests. Secondly, individual nations
could seek to become beacons of democratization in a way which would encourage
the U.S. to groom them as model nations. Given the recent democratic turbulence
'in the region, this seems very unlikely. If anything, 2005 - 2009 looks like more
of the same in West Africa: ethnic conflict, economic hardship and significant
violence, met from Washington with little more than a distant grimace.

Notes
I Since at least the 1970s, Antoino Gramsci (1891-1937) is being considered as one of the most
important Marxist theorists since Marx. His ideas were written in Italian prisons in elliptical and
allusive style so as to escape the censors. Thereafter, they were complied and published under the
title, Prison Notebooks.

In this context, Gramsci meant the mechanisms of socialization such as the church, mass media,
and the trade unions.

2

See Talcott Parsons, "Some Reflections on the Place of Force in Social Processes;' in Harry
Eckstein, ed. Internal War (New York, Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), pp.33-70.

3

4

See his preface to a Critique of Political Economy, 1859.

Karl Marx,'''The German Ideology:' in Robert C. Tucker, ed. The Marx-Engles Reader, New
York, W:W:Norton, 1972, p.3

5

6 Consciousness, it is said, is determined by one's place in the means of production. False
consciousness is not an error of fact, but of reasoning and perception.
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See the selections from the Political Writings of Antonio Gramsci (1910-1920), ed. Quintin
Hoare, International Publishers, New York, 1977, P. 3

7

8 Salamini Leonardo: Gramsci and the Marxist Sociology of Knowledge, Sociological Quarterly,
1984,15(3): 359-380.
9It is supposed to be an assault on cultural and ideological hegemony.
10 Femia,].Y.: Gramsci's Political Thought, Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1981.
II Bates, Thomas: "Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony;' Journal of the History ofIdeas, 1975, 36
(2):351-366

12 IBID, Salamini.
13 Scott, james, "Hegemony and the Peasantry;' Politics and Society, 1977,7 (3):267-296.
14 Adamson, Walter, Hegemony and Revolution: A Study ofAntonio Gramsci's Political and Cultural
Theory, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1980.
15 SKLAR, Richard, "The Nature of Class Domination in Africa;' Journal of Modern African
Studies, E.B.1979,17 (4):531-552.
16 Boahen, Adu, Africa Under Colonialism, Berkley, University of California Press, 1985. The book
is a UNESCO General History of Africa, No.7

17 Marsh, Pearl-Alice, "Labour Reform and Security Repression in South Africa" Journal of
Africanist Opinion, 1982, 12 (3-4):49-55
18 Berman, Bruce,"Structure and Process in the Bureaucratic States ofColonial Africa," Development
and Change, 15,1984.
19 O'Brien, D.C. Saints and Politicians: See also R.Berts, Assimilation and Association in French
Colonial Theory, 1890-1914, New York, Columbia University Press, 1981.
20 Robinson, Roland,"Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory
of Collaboration'; From Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe, eds. Studies in the Theory of Imperialism,
1972.
21 Warburg, Gabriel, "British Rule in the Nile Valley, 1882-1956, and Robinson's Theory of
Collaboration'; Asian and African Studies, 15, 1981.
22 Laitin, David;' Hegemony and Religious Conflict: British Imperial Control and Political
Changes in Yorubaland, In Peter Evans, ed.al. Bringing the State Back In, 1985.
23 Laitin, David, Capitalism and Hegemony: Yourubaland and the International Economy,
International Organization 198236 (4): 678-713.
24 Farton, Robert: The Making of a Liberal Democracy, Senegal's Passive Revolution, 1975-1985,
Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 1987.
2SFatton, Robert: Black Consciousness in South Africa, the Dialectics of Ideological Resistance to
White Supremacy, State University of New York Press, 1986.
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Robinson, David, MSU lecture series.
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Report of the United Nations Economic and Social Council, 36'h Session, A/36/513, P.2
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See p.138
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